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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court had jurisdiction or discretion to grant 
defendants Gene V. and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords") leave to amend 
their answer and state a counterclaim for damages. This first appears to be a 
question of law that the Court reviews for correctness. Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 
231, 232 (Utah 1976) This second is a question that the Court reviews for abuse of 
discretion. Pett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, f4, 106 P.3d 705 The issues were 
preserved in the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim (RR. 821); Reply to Amended Counterclaim 
(RR. 846, 849); and Pretrial Order (RR. 887, 888, f 3). 
2. Whether the finding that plaintiff National Advertising Company 
("NAC") breached the Standard Lease Agreement was clearly erroneous. Roderick 
v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, %2, 54 P.3d 1119 
3. Whether the finding that the Crawfords were entitled to damages 
against NAC was clearly erroneous. Roderick v. Ricks, supra 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed on October 4, 1996. (R. 1) The case went to summary 
judgment for NAC on December 6, 1996. (R. 80) The Crawfords appealed (Case 
No. 980238-CA), and the judgment was vacated because of questions about 
service of process. (R. 387) 
On remand, the trial court reversed its decision and entered summary 
judgment for the Crawfords. (R. 675) The trial court resolved the service of 
process issue, over NAC's objection (R. 568), on summary judgment. (R. 652) 
NAC appealed (Case No. 2000085 0-C A), and the trial court decision was 
reversed. (R. 686) This time, a trial was held on the service of process issue, and 
the Crawfords prevailed. Judgment was entered for the Crawfords on August 2, 
2002. (R. 796) 
NAC appealed (Case No. 20020717-CA). This was the first time that the 
Court of Appeals considered the case on the merits. The Crawfords prevailed (R. 
811), and the case was remitted on December 15, 2003. (R. 809) 
On December 23, 2003, the Crawfords filed a Motion for Leave to File 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 814) For the first time in the 
seven-year history of the case, the Crawfords made a damage claim against NAC. 
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Their claim was for breach of contract, specifically, the Standard Lease 
Agreement. The claim was that NAC breached the Lease by failing to remove its 
outdoor advertising sign from the Crawfords' property. (RR. 838, 841) 
Importantly, the claim was that NAC breached the Lease on October 23, 
1996, which was the date on which the Crawfords claimed that the Lease had been 
terminated. (R. 937,1fl|2-3) The Crawfords waited more than seven years, and 
after full and final judgment, before making this claim. 
The trial court granted the Motion (R. 835), and the case went to trial and 
judgment for the Crawfords. (R. 934) Judgment was for all the sign income the 
Crawfords claimed to have lost during the pendency of the case. (RR. 938, f4) 
Specifically, this was from November, 1996 to May, 2003. 
This ignored the fact thai NAC was the prevailing party in the case from 
December 6, 1996 to August 28, 2000. NAC removed its sign from the 
Crawfords' property once they became the prevailing parties (August 2, 2002). (R. 
890, fin) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the facts supporting the disputed findings are contained in the 
stipulated Pretrial Order. (R. 887) The rest come from the trial transcript and the 
district court record: 
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On December 10, 1974, NAC entered into a Standard Lease Agreement with 
the then owner of the Crawfords' property. (RR. 889a, 895) The Lease term began 
on February 1, 1975 and had an initial term often years, followed by another ten-
year term, and thereafter from year to year "until terminated as of any subsequent 
anniversary of the effective date [February 1] by written notice of termination 
given not less than sixty days prior to such anniversary date by either the Lessor or 
Lessee." (R. 889d & e) 
The Crawfords purchased the property in December, 1995. (R. 889c) Even 
though the Lease was in the middle of a 1-year term, the Crawfords applied for an 
outdoor advertising permit of their own. (RR. 60, %5 & 63) Murray City granted 
the application and issued a "contingent" sign permit. (R. 890k) The permit "was 
not to become effective unless and until [NAC's] sign was removed from the 
Property." (R. 60, fl) 
On April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified NAC that they were terminating 
the Lease pursuant to [^9. (RR. 890g) Paragraph 9 provides as follows: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied 
by the Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction 
or remodeling, as evidenced by a building permit, requiring removal 
of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate this Lease upon 
giving the Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of termination, 
together with a copy of the building permit,.... 
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The Crawfords did not send a copy of the building permit. (R. 903) 
Therefore, they followed the first notice with a notice dated June 10, 1996. (R. 
890h) The June 10, 1996 notice stated: "A copy of the building permit for the 
new development will be sent as soon as it is issued." (R. 905) 
Brad Crawford testified that the building permit was faxed to NAC on July 
25, 2003. (TR 9/1-7) Therefore, on August 7, 1996, Mr. Crawford sent a third 
notice: "I have complied with all notification requirements as specified in 
paragraph 9 of the Lease." (RR. 890i, 908) 
Mr. Crawford went further: "I feel that as of August 3, 1996, all notification 
requirements as specified in paragraph 9 of the Lease have been met. I also feel it 
is quite clear that the 90 day notification period expired on July 29, 1996. This is 
90 days after your receipt of notice on April 30, 1996. This means that National 
Advertising Company is now illegally trespassing on my father[']s property." (R. 
908) 
Along with the August 7, 1996 notice, the Crawfords sent a copy of the 
Master Site Plan "showing the proposed use of the area where the sign is located." 
(R. 909) The Site Plan showed that NAC's sign covered four parking stalls in the 
northwest corner of the property. (R. 910) In his testimony at trial, Mr. Crawford 
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confirmed that the sign needed to be moved in order to accommodate those four 
parking stalls. (TR 19/17-25, 20/1) 
This did not mean that the sign had to be "removed" as required by the 
Lease. In fact, the Master Site Plan shows that NAC's sign was not to be removed, 
but to be "relocated" a few feet away. (R. 910) Mr. Crawford explained that the 
architect is the one who wrote in: "New location for billboard sign (relocated)." 
(TR/19/15-16) Mr. Crawford is the one who wrote in: "Existing sign (to be 
removed)." (TR 19/11-13) 
Mr. Crawford explained that once his parents acquired a sign permit of their 
own, it was their intention to have NAC's sign removed from the property. (TR 
20/15-20) The Crawfords did not want to own the sign, but they did intend to own 
and control the sign permit. (TR 15/8-25) A new sign (owned by Star Media) is 
located on the very spot marked out on the Master Site Plan. (TR 20/2-6) 
Importantly, NAC was not told its sign could be "relocated" on the 
Crawfords' property. (TR 20/11-25) There had been some discussion about 
moving the sign nearly a year ago (TR 20/15-17), but none of the f9 termination 
notices said anything about this. (RR. 903, 905, 908) 
NAC could see (from the Site Plan) that the Crawfords' remodeling and 
construction did not require "removal" of its sign. Therefore, it did not remove the 
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sign in response to the %9 notices. The Crawfords were not too certain about the 
%9 termination because on November 25, 1996, they sent another notice stating 
that the Lease would be terminated under ^3. (R. 890j) NAC honored this notice 
and removed its sign at the end of the Lease term. (R. 890n) 
NAC's sign was not in the way of the building. (R. 910) It was long gone 
before construction got to the parking lot. (TR 24/15-24) Mr. Crawford testified 
that the sign was in the way of the grading (TR 24/8-14), but he admitted that the 
Crawfords suffered no damage as a result. (TR 27/7-18) 
Even though NAC's sign was removed from the Crawfords' property at the 
end of the Lease term, the Crawfords were prevented from erecting a sign of their 
own because NAC had relocated its sign to the neighbor's property. (R. 8901-n) 
Admittedly, this was "pursuant to the rulings of this Court and permits issued by 
Murray City and the Utah Department of Transportation." (R. 8901) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The district court was without jurisdiction or discretion to grant the 
Crawfords leave to amend their answer and state a counterclaim for damages. The 
Crawfords waited to make their Motion until after the final judgment entered by 
the district court had been affirmed by this Court on the third appeal. There is no 
question that the Crawfords' counterclaim had "matured" by the time of the filing 
7 
of their original answer. The Crawfords never offered any explanation for their 
late filing. They never moved to reopen the judgment under URCP 60(b) or 59(e). 
2. The trial court's finding that NAC breached f 9 of the Lease was 
clearly erroneous. The Crawfords' construction and remodeling did not require 
"removal" of NAC s sign. The Crawfords made provision for "relocating" the 
sign on their property, but their intention was to replace NAC's sign with one of 
their own. NAC was not required to remove its sign until the end of the Lease 
term, which it did. 
3. The trial court's finding that the Crawfords were entitled to damages 
against NAC was clearly erroneous. NAC's alleged breach of the Lease did not 
cause the Crawfords any damages. They were prevented from erecting a sign 
because of the permits issued to NAC by Murray City and the Utah Department of 
Transportation. Those permits were issued as a result of a ruling by the district 
court that NAC had the only valid sign permit. 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR 
DISCRETION TO GRANT THE CRAWFORDS' MOTION FOR 
LEAVE. 
The Crawfords' Motion was based on URCP 13(d). (R. 818) The Crawfords 
did not claim that they "acquired" the claim after filing their original answer. They 
claimed that it did not "mature" until after the third and final appeal. (R. 818) 
No Utah case has defined "matured" as it is used in URCP 13(d). However, 
13(d) is the substantial equivalent of FRCP 13(e). Federal cases are of some help. 
One said that FRCP 13(e) applies to a claim that "could not have been filed 
because it did not exist when the answer was due." Harbor Insurance Co. v. 
Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1990) 
This is not the case here. In the notice dated August 7, 1996, Brad Crawford 
stated: "I feel that as of August 3, 1996, all notification requirements as specified 
in paragraph 9 of the Lease have been met. I also feel it is quite clear that the 90 
day notification period expired on July 29, 1996. This is 90 days after your receipt 
of notice on April 30, 1996. This means that National Advertising is now illegally 
trespassing on my father[']s property." 
These statements leave nothing to the imagination. According to the 
Crawfords, NAC was in breach of the Lease as early as July 29, 1996, but no later 
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than October 23, 1996: "Thus, National was required to remove its sign from the 
Property by no later than October 23, 1996." (R. 937, f2) 
Damages were awarded to the Crawfords "from November of 1996 to May 
of 2003." (R. 938, %4) How could the Crawfords receive damages into 1996 if 
their claim did not "exist" in 1996? 
For their part, the Crawfords could only say: "If [we] had previously pled 
the proposed counterclaim..., any proceedings on that claim would no doubt have 
been stayed pending the outcome of the permit issue. Consequently, if [we] had 
included the proposed counterclaim in [our] initial answer and counterclaim, 
nothing would have happened on that claim until now." (R. 818 n.l) 
This is no doubt true, but it does nothing to show whether the Crawfords' 
counterclaim had "matured." Besides, the Crawfords' claim of permit invalidity 
was not dependent on its claimed termination under [^9 of the Lease. In the last of 
the three appeals, this Court said that question was "ultimately irrelevant to our 
decision." (Memorandum Decision, Case No. 20020717-CA) 
The Crawfords' Motion was also based on URCP 13(e), but this position 
was even worse. The Crawfords gave no reason why the Motion was not filed 
earlier except for the erroneous claim of lack of "maturity." (R. 818) 
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The court in Valley Disposal Inc. v. Central Vermont Solid Waste 
Management District, 113 F.3d 357 (2nd Cir. 1997) said that: 
A belated motion to file [a counterclaim] may properly be denied 
where the delay is lengthy or where there is no reasonable explanation 
for the failure to assert it, or to make the motion, earlier. See, e.g., 
Crown Life Insurance Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 35 
F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming refusal to allow a 
counterclaim first asserted by defendant three months after the district 
court granted summary judgment for plaintiff); Imperial Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Firemanrs Fund Insurance Co., 535 F.2d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 
1976) (same where defendant "was aware of the facts underlying its 
alleged counterclaim for almost a year before it made its motion"); 
Kirbens v. Wodis, 295 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1961) (same where 
request to assert counterclaim for a setoff was made after entry of 
judgment for plaintiff though the defendant could have asserted the 
claim at least two and one-half years earlier). 
113F.3dat365 
In opposition to the Motion, NAC cited the following Utah cases in which 
the decision to deny a motion to leave was affirmed: Atcitty v. San Juan County 
School District, 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1998) (motion filed two and a half 
months after the discovery cut-off); Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah 
App. 1998) (motion filed after discovery cut-off and summary judgment); Hill v. 
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 1992) (motion 
filed six years into the litigation, by which time, summary judgment had been 
granted, and case was back from appeal to the Utah Supreme Court). 
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These cases show that the trial court never should have exercised discretion 
(assuming it had discretion) to consider the Crawfords' Motion. For their part, the 
only legal authority cited by the Crawfords was Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 
(Utah 1971). The two cases could not be more different. 
Gillman involved an automobile accident, and defendant was represented by 
insurance defense counsel. Counsel did not meet with defendant until just before 
her deposition, which was the first taken in the case. At the meeting, insurance 
defense counsel realized that defendant had a counterclaim. The motion for leave 
to assert a counterclaim was made right after defendant's deposition. 
Before the deposition, the parties had exchanged some interrogatories and 
made certain motions. However, the case was not scheduled for trial. There is 
nothing like that here. The Crawfords waited until after two trials and a third and 
final appeal before making their Motion. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition, NAC also cited Nichols v. State, supra: 
"Utah has adopted the majority rule that an order of dismissal is a final 
adjudication, and thereafter, the plaintiff must move under Rules 59(e) or 60(b) to 
reopen the judgment." 554 P.2d at 232 
This is also the federal rule, Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 27, 29 (10th Cir. 
1985); Glenn v. First National Bank, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989) It says 
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that after entry of the final judgment (August 2, 2002), the Crawfords were 
required to reopen the judgment before moving for leave to amend. 
These cases hold that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider 
the Crawfords' Motion for Leave without reopening the judgment under URCP 
60(b) or 59(e). Either way, the Crawfords' Motion never should have been 
granted. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NAC BREACHED THE 
LEASE WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Without a claimed breach of duty, there is no basis for a damage claim. The 
Crawfords left no question that the alleged breach of [^9 was the basis for their 
damage claim. (R. 937, [^16) The parties stipulated that NAC removed its sign at 
the end of the Lease term. (R. 890n) 
The facts concerning this claim are not in dispute: After buying the property 
in December, 1995, the Crawfords decided that they wanted to own the sign 
permit. Therefore, on March 5, 1995, the Crawfords applied to Murray City for a 
sign permit of their own. The sign permit was contingent on removal of NAC s 
existing sign, but the Lease did not end until February 1, 1997. Therefore, the only 
way for the Crawfords to get NAC to remove its sign, before the end of the Lease 
term, was under ^ [9. 
13 
Paragraph 9 is conditioned on permanent construction or remodeling 
requiring "removal" of NAC s sign. The Master Site Plan produced by the 
Crawfords showed that NAC's sign blocked four parking spaces. There is no 
question that NAC's sign had to be moved, and allowance was made for its 
"relocation" a few feet away. However, the Crawfords did not say anything about 
this in any of the three notices they sent trying to terminate the Lease under }^9. 
The Crawfords wanted NAC to remove its sign so that their permit would become 
effective. As a result, NAC would have been precluded from replacing the sign on 
the Crawfords' property or on the neighbor's property. The Crawfords' new sign 
was placed in the very spot identified in the Master Site Plan. 
It is natural that the Lease would condition early termination on permanent 
construction or remodeling requiring "removal" of the sign. If the sign could be 
moved somewhere else on the property, there would be no need to terminate the 
Lease before the end of its normal term. The Crawfords' interpretation of %9 was 
too narrow. The trial court obviously adopted this interpretation. The trial court's 
finding was clearly erroneous. 
Even though NAC did not remove its sign until the end of the Lease term, it 
did not interfere with construction of the parking spaces. NAC's sign was long 
gone by the time construction got to the parking lot. Brad Crawford testified that 
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the sign was in the way of the grading work, but he admitted that the Crawfords 
suffered no damage as a result, which leads to the final point. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRAWFORDS WERE 
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AGAINST NAC WAS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
The Crawfords were never able to demonstrate that NAC's presumed breach 
of f 9 caused them any damage. Even if they were right about the interpretation of 
f 9, they did not have an actionable claim because what caused them the loss was 
not the breach of f9, but the issuance of a competing sign permit to NAC. This is 
evident from the undisputed findings of the trial court: 
Despite receiving the fl[9] Notices, [NAC] did nol remove its 
sign from the Property. Instead, [NAC] obtained a competing 
permit.. .and erected the Sign [on the neighbor's property]. By doing 
so, [NAC] precluded the Crawfords from: (a) allowing another entity 
to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property; and (b) 
collecting a monthly rental fee from that entity. The Crawfords were 
precluded from doing so until May of2003. 
(R. 937, f 16) (emphasis added) 
The alleged breach of the Lease had nothing to do with this. This is evident 
from the stipulated facts in the Pretrial Order: 
[NAC] obtained its Permit on a neighboring parcel of property 
and erected an outdoor advertising sign pursuant to the rulings of this 
Court and permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of 
Transportation. 
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(R. 8901) (emphasis added) 
This is perhaps the most important point in the case, and it bears repeating: 
NAC never would have erected a sign on the Crawfords' neighbor's property 
except for permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of 
Transportation. These entities never would have issued their permits except for the 
ruling from the trial court that NAC was the prevailing party and had the only valid 
sign permit. Once the Crawfords became the prevailing parties in the litigation, 
NAC removed its sign from the neighbor's property. 
Therefore, it does not matter whether NAC breached the Lease. The 
Crawfords did not suffer any damage as a result. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court never should have considered the Crawfords' Motion for 
Leave to File Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. After the third appeal 
to this Court, the judgment was final. The only way for the Crawfords to make 
such a motion was to reopen the judgment under URCP 60(b) or 59(e). They 
never did. 
Assuming the trial court had discretion to consider the Crawfords' Motion, it 
abused that discretion by permitting the Crawfords to assert a counterclaim for 
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damages after the case had proceeded to final judgment. There is no question that 
the counterclaim was "mature" at the time of the filing of the original answer. 
There is no question that the Crawfords were aware of the basis for the 
counterclaim from the beginning of the case. They simply failed to raise it and 
never offered a valid explanation for the late filing of their Motion. 
NAC did not breach |^9 of the Lease. The Crawfords' remodeling and 
construction did not require "removal" of NAC s sign. The Crawfords made plans 
for "relocation" of the sign within a few feet of its existing location. Their plans 
were for someone other than NAC to replace the sign. That way, they could share 
in the advertising revenue, which was their right, but not until the end of the Lease 
term. 
No matter what the Court concludes on the [^9 issue, breach of the Lease did 
not cause the Crawfords any damage. They were prevented from erecting a sign 
on their property by the sign permits issued to NAC by Murray City and UDOT. 
Those permits never would have been issued except for the ruling by the district 
court that NAC had the only valid sign permit. Once the Crawfords became the 
prevailing parties in the litigation, NAC removed its sign. 
For the foregoing reasons, judgment for the Crawfords (R. 934) should be 
REVERSED. 
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DATED this ^ i ^ d a y of May, 2005. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
^iki— 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Steven K. Gordon 
Durham, Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City UT 84145-5678 
18 
S T A N D A R D LEASE AGREEMFNT 
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l , of Bedford Park, Illinois,'hereinafter called the Lessee. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
1. The Lessor hereby leases unto the Lessee, and the Lessee hereby leases from the Lessor, the use and possession of the portion to be occupied of the follow. 
inc. described premise^, for the purposes of erecting and maintaining advertising displays (painted, reflectorised, printed, illuminated, or otherwise), including 
necessary structure*, devices, power poles and connections. -r ^ . • 
2. The property herein demised is located abot i t_LUL£2.mile i N - E ^ ) W o f . . i t t ^ r k . - ^ 7 7 7 ^ . . . . . ^ 7 ? £ 5 ^ T . . . H on 
the N^-E-f S->X' side of Route No...•*++%...V..Jft?. for displays) (uinfYQ-E^Sy w\ such leased property being part of the Lessor's property situated 
the Townshij 
~
J
.X(kA.: !.. 
.County of . ^ I I L T t—^rl'C 
State of . . . ...vrr...J..cW.}^ . . . . . . . . . (If Legal Description is required, see reverse tide hereof.) 
3. The term of this '.rase shall commence on .19-1 ^ Tand unless terminated earlier in the manner hereinafter set t'.irth. shall continue fur 
an iniiial :erm of ten years frcm the first day of the first month following erection of the advertising display(s) (hereinafter called "the effective date"i. and shall 
continue thereafter, at the option of the Leuct, for a second term of ten years, and thereafter from year to year, on the same terms, until tei minuted aa of any subs*, 
queue anniversary of the effective dAtc by written notice of termination given not less than sixty days prior to such anniversary date by either the Lessor or Lessee. 
<L In consideration of the fort going and the mutual promises herein contained, and other good and valuable consideration, the Lessee .icrees to pcy 
the Lessor at the raje v .per year for such periods of time as the display(t) contemplated hereunder is(axc) not in advertising position, and at the 
t*ic of S^jZ^JLl k.A*per year (or such periods of time as the display(s) contemplated hereunder is(are) in position. Such yearly rental is to be paui in advance 
(subject to a ;>0 daydclay for processing) with supplementary adjustments to be made promptly when the advertising status of the disj>ia>(>) is c'un^cd. When 
feasible, the payment date will be adjusted to coincide with an anniversary of the effective date. 
5. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS. The provisions printed on the reverse hereof are hereby incorporated herein by specific reference thereto and con* 
stitute a past of this agreement. 
Size ^ . & . ! £ £ Ft. 
HAGL....3>0.:.^>.jS... .Ft 
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Location Staked 
Display Facing . .tV>4.fl^..Tr?.. . . 
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,M: 
APPROVE! 
Accepted by 
' Lessor in the presence or,, 
I L t2=— T ^ i ^ - r > - i>* ^ » ' (Owner) S g OJT?MKa>lt>vL (If applicable) 
^ ^>' " / CPrlnt Uuor-s Name) 
7 X^ - ^ >/ l*/s-*i*c^r*c^ .__ 
(Signature) 
q . y ' i L S L 7 T H - ?*•* (L)&<rr 
By 
il 
EXHIBIT "A" 
(Mailing Addrcts) .«_ . 
CUy, County, icatc) 
Si NWrher cjw LwSOf poc the Ltfw o^ shall be bound by any n r^cc-xv.cnc or rupnrttnfcitfnn, uxprctfod Or jmpliVrL not conraJrcd hctvliu TbN 
kriitf jhaii be dt-fWed tO h.ivij biilfn acct-pUhl RaJ it.*, fufms. «>nfArrejhli» ^My up-»n dw jr^'PtAMct' h«*M.f by rhu f.^ P^ wvi in tta *p.4<?« pr^vtdwlc Faitow* 
inn *uch o^veptinei* it $hiif Jnurt.sb the benefit <?tf and ,hc bindin* upon the parties huf£tft and to *b<?rr re.^wcrive icrt.int% heirs, »uce«*or*, perioral 
/npfpsc-nutlvcs C*ULU WM, admit fa tratott, in*] assign*, 
*X Ul the <Siiru that <htt fOrtirt^  of she LciSor'i property- (K»;vr>{<*d by tlw f.citt*'ft Jfepb/* «i W b<t ii;:pfavad by pcfnup«?nc <inmc(uctkri rtr 
fKtnoiJelirtR, a* tv^un^d by .1 building i<i<rmtt\ fc^uinnn fwmoval nf iJ\v J-es Ssrc*ii display*, the (xsaof r.\*y «u-min^r* ihia kusc upon tf«yi(i£ th« I n wo 
ntarfy (90) days writttfJl poCiOii of rvrimnaclwi, JCT^KUHK wirh u copy nf chv buiidintf permit, iCftt by rtiflfofurfcd 0>tdt *a vidur the LctAuc'i II01M OtYke 
rrr the Vtauih Oj/ietf JJtaud. and l>p«n t?»w* »-«m>r** refunding to tliu la^ctt the fenfc PfCvtCU/lly paa<i Ttit the un«xpiJ'td p<>ftion lit chit i«15C beyOOi! Che 
WUAatiatt dace, Yhc Lcsxti* agree* M evmnve lU dixplayn wiihiq rlw 90 via/ period. Ii' the Lciso/ doe* HOC (.'unutiertM chc cnaStruCPGn Or cvft'-Odidinfl 
within ninety (yo) days aftttf the tjiifUyx h*** bt-ea removed, ch* Lassee- may, *« it* option, roinatacc chis fcasu fay vrltcca aotJcc fo tho Liwor, and 
if 5a ffifisearftdt i^^ La war aarcvi fa* reirobiirae rhu I M W I - ^ r itl r.-<Miot*xb1* c^p^n««f )n the t#<noNin^ io«i ccp^aCioK of <-W I>CIACP'> U/nriiuys on ctTC 
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20. If at any tltnv the hfjgtiwaf vt^w of tho UI;K«'S dlfpUyt is obstructed or obscuroci* v? tlitif advertising VAIU^ of the dUpbys U iwpilnti of 
dlirtlnUhuff, or the nit! 9f ImtaltuCrtn of ivich -Jlsplayj* U pr^v«r.t«U or rc'ntf Jci«d i>Y law 0/ by clttf i-csjoe^ in*lbiiity «o obcain «ny necessary pof «i;j 
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t!ic I ^ « « may, ^t ji* Option* ItfmirACi? rhll ku^e by giving the tttAl>r firtcCft (15) days W^ttcn ht>t)cPi and (he iC5<Qf IfjrCW to ftfund tti ch« ItSitMj 
ll>e ront prevjouify pptd itor the unexpired pOCliorl (>f th»t \tMt. ff any (jf the C"miiri«)f)* described n^ thU pjirapr^ph sS.lll at any time rcmPOfrtfily <UiU 
•1*^ »W Lar»t« m^y( M< *?s oprirtn^  iojtca.i of ctr:iiii<.Jtiag «|ij» teajc* U? entUUd to n^ ,ibaCcn^nc of rear payabU.* hereunder d^rinff ch<? period 8uch*';on» 
ditioas or any of \}\crn cxliet ^nd to *h^ ttfand of any rent pti(4 in idvaaco fyt the period of such abnccni*»c« 
\\, AH scratfturos* dUplayi and M>itcfJ»'!x pli\ci>d upaA <h* *»"? pf<p*»tv by lh« Lciacc grc Lc-.-Aec'* uado Axrurcs and equipment* ard shaft 
b(A ind rcttjuii> the L^A^O'S p<op«rsy, and may b« Kniov^d by thu Ie«is..-c ar fl<iy ci«i^ prior t« or svithin"a^o^oi;^hjc lime ufter thu terminadfla of (his ' 
JouA* of Any (xtvnsfoo th^recf. Ths Le.ix<); *prc« trt allow rjifr trrscc fuii flCcci-; :a the praptfcy occupied'by the dlfpi^y* for th« pucpom of cru"-! n^ # 
tttakiAlainin^t ^ban^ia^ or fCrxiovtng the difjriays at any time. 
U, TT\o t*J^ 50f atjrCQS n*v« to *rcct or p<>tnift any o<hof psriy tt> erccc any advcrtWnff dispfAya ot ot',^f ndvortxdng mittta* on any ptoperfy-
0wnt*d Or control)vd bv thft U'tlor wlth>r> * r.idiui of AIV hundred ((>0C>) rvct of l^-»vtf4t di;p'v/'» ftf>? " pefjnit any cither uh%rrutttMfi to p.lfCi-»Uy Of 
cpm^iUeelY obscure the Aorrr.al Wt^ »S»v iy wi,-w vtv s-iJU dfrptay:* C"i4 ?be U;«ny« ii l i c u t ^ uM'.^ .cr/avd tti riM:HJV'»* .lily tJ\(CU Qthur atlvoc'..iin^ display <?r 
wl^r obitrucTion uc its option. 
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM JONES & P1NEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. 
and Sherry T. Crawford 
Donald L. Dalton (4305) 
DALTON & KELLY 
2458 Sunnyside Avenue 
P.O. Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Telephone: (803) 583-2510 
Attorney for Plaintiff National 
Advertising Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD, 
SHERRY T CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, 
L.L.C. 
Defendants. 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Civil No. 960906952CV 
Judge Dennis J. Frederick 
1. JURISDICTION. Jurisdiction is not contested and is found to exist. 
2. VENUE. Venue is not contested and is found to be proper. 
3. NATURE OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES. 
This case involves two competing permits for the construction of an outdoor advertising 
sign. The first (the "Crawfords' Permit") was issued to Gene and Sherry Crawford (the 
"Crawfords"). The second ("National's Permit") was subsequently issued to National 
Advertising Company ("National"). One permit had to be invalidated because Murray's zoning 
ordinances preclude the existence of both. This Court previously ruled that the Crawfords' 
Permit is valid and that National's Permit is null and void. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The remaining claims are contained in the Crawfords' Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim. The Crawfords contend that National failed/refused to remove its sign from the 
Property in accordance with the Notices and the Lease, and instead wrongfully obtained a 
competing permit and erected the Sign, thereby precluding the Crawfords from erecting their 
own sign on the Property. The Crawfords argue Nationals' conduct constitutes a breach of the 
Lease, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Lease, a trespass, 
and/or an unlawful detainer. 
National's denials and defenses, which are contained in its Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim ("National's Opposing 
Memo") and Reply to Amended Counterclaim ("National's Reply"), are as follows: (1) National 
complied with all provisions of the Lease and breached no duty to the Crawfords; (2) the 
damages claimed by the Crawfords were the result of actions taken by National in compliance 
with this Court's rulings and permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of 
Transportation; (3) the Amended Counterclaim is barred by URCP 59(e) and 60(b), because 
under Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), the Crawfords had "to reopen the judgment" 
before moving to amend and the time for doing so had run; (4) Utah does not recognize a claim 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)); (5) Utah does not recognize a claim for unjust enrichment 
where there is an enforceable written or oral contract (see Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah 
2 
App. 1987)); and (6) there is no claim for unlawful detainer in the absence of prior notice to the 
alleged detainer. 
4. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
a . In December of 1974, National entered into a lease (the "Lease") which allowed it 
to construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at approximately 
4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the "Property"). 
b. On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords granted their son, Brad Crawford, a general 
power of attorney 
c. In December of 1995, Brad Crawford purchased the Property on behalf of his 
parents, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor under the Lease. 
d. Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall commence on February 1, 
1975, and continue for ten years. 
e. Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall continue for an additional 
ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by the Lessor as of any subsequent 
anniversary of the Lease upon at least sixty days written notice. 
f. Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the Lessee's 
displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, as evidenced 
by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor 
may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of 
termination, together with a copy of the building permit, by registered mail to 
either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the 
Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion 
of this Lease beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its 
displays within the 90 day period. 
3 
g. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified 
National that its sign must be removed from the Property. 
h. As of June 10, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the 
Crawfords notified National a second time that its sign must be removed from the Property. 
i. As of August 7, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the 
Crawfords notified National a third time that its sign must be removed from the Property. The 
April 23, 1996 notice, the June 10, 1996 notice and the August 7, 1996 notice will hereinafter be 
referred to as (the "Notices"). 
j . On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been 
terminated pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, the Crawfords notified National in writing, 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, that the Lease would be terminated as of February 1, 1997, 
the next anniversary date. 
k. On March 29, 1996, Murray City issued to the Crawfords^ Permit. 
I. Subsequently, National obtained its Permit on a neighboring parcel of property 
and erected an outdoor advertising sign (the "Sign") pursuant to the rulings of this Court and 
permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of Transportation. 
m. On August 2, 2002, this Court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit is valid and that 
National's Permit is null and void. That ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in a 
Memorandum Decision dated October 9, 2003. 
n. National erected the Sign on the neighbor's property in February of 1997. The 
Sign remained up until September of 2002. 
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5. DISPUTED FACTS 
The Crawfords contend that despite receiving the Notices, National: (1) failed and/or 
refused to remove its sign from the Property in accordance with the Notices and the Lease; (2) 
instead wrongfully obtained a competing permit (which has been invalidated) and erected the 
Sign; (3) thereby precluding the Crawford's from erecting their own sign on the Property and 
from collecting advertising revenue until May of 2003. 
6. CONTESTED ISSUE OF LAW 
a. Whether National failed and/or refused to remove its sign from the Property in 
accordance with the Notices and the Lease, and instead obtained a competing permit (which has 
been invalidated) and erected the Sign, thereby precluding the Crawfords from erecting their own 
sign on the Property. 
b. If the answer to the question posed in paragraph 6(a) is "yes," whether National's 
conduct constitutes: (1) a breach of the Lease; (2) a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in the Lease; (3) a trespass; and/or (4) an unlawful detainer. 
c. If the answer to the question posed in paragraph 6(b) is "yes:" (1) what is the 
correct measure of damages; and (2) must National disgorge all advertising revenue it has 
received in connection with the Sign. 
7. EXHIBITS 
A joint set of Exhibits is attached as Exhibit A. The parties have stipulated to the 
authenticity, relevance and materiality of these exhibits. 
8. WITNESSES 
5 
a. The Crawfords will call Brad Crawford and any witnesses called by National. 
b. National may call Steve Christiansen and Monte Merrill, and any witnesses called 
by the Crawfords. 
9. DISCOVERY. Discovery is complete. 
10. TRIAL SETTING. A bench trial is set for a one day on October 19, 2004. 
11. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. The possibility of settlement is poor. 
DATED October j l , 2004. 
Approved 
Steve K. Gordon 
Attorney for the Crawfofds 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorney for National Advertising Company 
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Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
Chad J. Pomeroy (9224) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Gene V. Crawford 
and Sherry T. Crawford 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
MAGED 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, GENE 
V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. 
CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, L.L.C. 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1
 AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A- Oc<k^ 
Civil No. 960906952CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This case involves two competing permits for outdoor advertising signs issued by Murray 
City Corporation ("Murray"). The first (the "Crawfords* Permit") was issued to defendants Gene 
V. Crawford and Sherry Crawtord, dba Vai-Uev, L.L.C. (collectively "the Crawfords"). The 
second ("National's Permit") was subsequently issued to plaintiff National Advertising Company 
("National"). Only one permit can be valid under Murray's zoning ordinances. This Court 
previously validated the Crawfords' Permit. The remaining claims are contained in the 
Crawfords' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
The Court held a bench trial on these claims on October 19, 2004. Steve K. Gordon of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law & Order <®J 
Durham Jones & Pinegar represented the Crawfords. Donald L. Dalton of Dalton & Kelley 
represented National. The Court has considered the pleadings submitted by the parties, the 
testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits accepted into evidence, and the arguments of counsel. 
Having done so, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L In December of 1974, National executed a lease (the "Lease") which allowed it, as 
lessee, to construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at 
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the "Property"). See 
Exhibit A. 
2. On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords granted their son, Brad Crawford, a general 
power of attorney. 
3. In December of 1995, Brad Crawford purchased the Property on his parents' 
behalf, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor under the Lease. 
4. The initial term of the Lease was from February 1, 1975 to January 31, 1985. See 
Exhibit A at ^[3. 
5. Subsequently, the Lease continued for an additional ten years, and thereafter from 
year to year, unless terminated by the lessor as of February 1 of any subsequent year upon at least 
sixty days written notice. See id. 
6. Paragraph 9 of the Lease states: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the Lessee's 
displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, as evidenced 
by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor 
may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of 
termination, together with a copy of the building permit, by registered mail to 
either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the 
Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion 
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of this Lease beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its 
displays within the 90 day period. 
7. Pursuant to paragraph 9, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified National that 
its sign must be removed from the Property (the "April 23 Notice"). 
8. On June 10, 1996, the Crawfords notified National a second time that its sign 
must be removed from the Property (the "June 10 Notice"). 
9. On July 25, 1996, the Crawfords delivered to National a copy of the building 
permit for the construction referenced in the April 23 Notice and the June 10 Notice (the 
"Building Permit"). 
10. On August 7, 1996, the Crawfords notified National a third time that its sign must 
be removed from the Property (the "August 7 Notice"). The April 23 Notice, the June 10 Notice 
and the August 7 Notice are referred to collectively as the "Notices." 
11. On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been 
terminated pursuant to paragraph 9, the Crawfords notified National in writing that the Lease 
would be terminated effective February 1, 1997 at the latest, pursuant to paragraph 3. 
12. On March 29, 1996, Murray issued the Crawfords' Permit. 
13. Subsequently, Murray issued National's Permit and National erected an outdoor 
advertising sign on property adjacent to the Property ( the "Sign"). 
14. Murray's zoning ordinances preclude the existence of both signs. On August 2, 
2002, this Court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit is valid and that National's Permit is "null and 
void." That ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in a Memorandum Decision dated 
October 9, 2003. 
15. The Sign was erected in February of 1997 and remained until September of 2002. 
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16. Despite receiving the Notices, National did not remove its sign from the Property. 
Instead, National obtained a competing permit (which has been ruled to be "null and void") and 
erected the Sign. By doing so, National precluded the Crawfords from: (a) allowing another 
entity to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property; and (b) collecting a monthly rental fee 
from that entity. The Crawfords were precluded from doing so until May of 2003. 
17. Since May of 2003, the Crawfords have: (a) allowed another entity to erect an 
outdoor advertising sign on the Property pursuant to an outdoor advertising lease (the "Second 
Lease"); and (b) collected monthly rental payments of approximately $1,050 per month pursuant 
to the Second Lease. 
18. The Crawfords were ready, willing and able to enter into the Second Lease as of 
November of 1996, but were precluded from doing so by National's failure to remove its sign 
from the Property in accordance with the Notices and paragraph 9 of the Lease. 
19. Each finding of fact that may be construed to be a conclusion of law shall be so 
construed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Crawfords satisfied all prerequisites for terminating the Lease pursuant to 
paragraph 9, and properly terminated the Lease, by providing National with: (1) the April 23 Notice; 
(2) the June 10 Notice; and (3) a copy of the Building Permit on July 25, 1996. 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 9, National was required to remove its sign from the Property 
within 90 days of receiving written notice of termination and a copy of the building permit. Thus, 
National was required to remove its sign from the Property by no later than October 23,1996. 
3. National breached the Lease, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
by not removing its sign from the Property by October 23, 1996. 
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4. As a result of National's breach of the Lease, and the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, the Crawfords were precluded from entering into the Second Lease, and receiving 
the monthly payment of $1,050 under the Second Lease, from November of 1996 to May of 2003. 
Consequently, National's breach of the Lease damaged the Crawfords by depriving them of 78 
monthly rental payments of $1,050, for a total of $81,900. 
5. Each conclusion of law that may be construed to be a finding of fact shall be so 
construed. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Court enters judgment for the Crawfords and against National 
in the amount of $81,900, plus prejudgment interest of $27,732.91 (from November 1, 1996 to 
October 25, 2004 [the date of the Court's minute entry] at the rate of 10% pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 154-1(2)), for a total of $109,632.91, plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 3.38% 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3). 
Approved: 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
